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Abstract—The intermittent nature of the renewable energies
increases the operation costs of conventional generators. As the
share of energy supplied by renewable sources increases, these
costs also increase. In this paper, we quantify these costs by
developing a market clearing price of energy in the presence
of renewable energy and congestion constraints. We consider an
electricity market where generators propose their asking price
per unit of energy to an independent system operator (ISO).
The ISO solve an optimization problem to dispatch energy from
each generator to minimize the total cost of energy purchased on
behalf of the consumers.
To ensure that the generators are able to meet the load
within a desired confidence level, we incorporate the notion
of load variance using the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVAR)
measure in an electricity market and we derive the amount
of committed power and market clearing price of energy as
a function of CVAR. It is shown that a higher penetration of
renewable energies may increase the committed power, market
clearing price of energy and consumer cost of energy due to
renewable generation uncertainties. We also obtain an upper-
bound on the amount that congestion constraints can affect the
committed power. We present descriptive simulations to illustrate
the impact of renewable energy penetration and reliability levels
on committed power by the non-renewable generators, difference
between the dispatched and committed power, market price of
energy and profit of renewable and non-renewable generators.
Keywords—Electricity Market, Renewable Energy, and Grid
Reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Growing concern over the effects of climate change has
caused a noticeable shift from non-renewable resources in
many parts of the world. As a result, renewable energy re-
sources are anticipated to play a crucial role in power systems
of the near-future. However, integration of renewable resources
into the electricity market, specifically high levels of penetra-
tion, requires several modifications in the electricity market
[2]. The primary reason for this is that a significant portion
of the load will be met by renewables with zero marginal
costs with higher penetration of renewable energies. The
production from renewable energy sources is highly uncertain
and variable and will eventually necessitate a higher capacity
of reserves to ensure grid reliability. Therefore, a higher
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penetration of renewable energy not only decreases the revenue
of the non-renewables but also can increase the maintenance
and operating cost of the non-renewable generators in a long
time-horizon. Thus, the electricity market should be modified
to take this uncertainty and variability into account and to
mitigate the impact on other entities involved in the market.
Despite available methods for mitigating uncertainty, e.g. en-
ergy storage systems, demand response etc., the uncertainties
of renewable generation remain as challenges to optimizing
generator dispatch in the day-ahead market (see [3, 4] and the
references therein).
In this paper, we consider an electric grid that delivers
demanded electricity to consumers. The grid consists of non-
renewable generator units, renewable generator units, and
consumers. The non-renewable generator units are composed
of a set of generators with different ramp constraints and cost
parameters. The non-renewable and renewable generators are
operated by different agents. We assume that the grid takes all
generated renewable energy, unless the total renewable genera-
tion is more than the aggregate load. Renewable generations in
excess of the load are curtailed. The non-renewable generator
is dispatched to meet the net-load, which is the consumer load
minus the renewable generator output. We also assume that the
load is not price sensitive and that load service entities submit
their hourly demand schedules to the ISO.
This work proposes an analytical method to study the
effect of (non-dispatchable) renewable generation capacity in
the dispatch strategy while considering grid reliability. For
the sake of simplicity and to enable the development of an
analytical solution, we consider a radial grid. In this paper, we
consider renewables with zero marginal cost and we assume
renewables are paid based on the market price of energy. In
our model, renewable energy production is described by a
stochastic process. The main contribution of this work is to
quantify the required power and market price of energy as a
function of renewables and loads statistics. The most important
result of this study is that the market clearing price of energy
is shown to be a non-decreasing function of the uncertainty
of the net load, and the reliability demanded by the consumer.
We derive an analytical solution for the amount of committed
power to meet the load within a desired level of reliability.
This analytical solution describes how the committed power
is affected by the tail distribution of the net-load. Higher
penetration of renewable energy increases the tail distribu-
tion of the net-load subsequently, the total committed power
increases. Additionally, the combination of uncertainties in
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2renewables generation and congestion constraints increases the
committed power for non-renewables. We derive an analytical
upper-bound on the committed power resulting from net-load
uncertainties and congestion constraint. To illustrate the ideas,
we first study how the market price of energy, generators
profit and committed power varies for different desired level
of reliability at a fixed penetration level of the renewables.
We observe that committed power, and price are increasing in
the desired level of reliability. A higher reliability level leads
to a higher planning for the committed power and increases
the expected deviation from committed power, as well as
associated cost. We denote this cost as the ’deviation cost’ and
obtain this cost as a function of the market price of energy.
We are interested to see how this deviation cost varies as the
penetration of renewables increases. Then, we study how the
market price of energy, generator profits and committed power
vary for different levels of penetration for a fixed reliability.
The total amount of committed power of non-renewable energy
first decreases as the penetration of the renewables increases
because the net-load decreases. After reaching a threshold, the
required power from non-renewables increases due to uncer-
tainty about the production of renewables. It is also shown
that the deviation cost is increasing in the penetration level.
This observation may be counter-intuitive as the preliminary
expectation is that the market price of energy decreases as the
penetration of the renewables increases, because of the lower
marginal cost of renewables. However, the uncertainties and
intermittencies of renewables are increasing in the penetration
level which in turn can increase the cost.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we formulate and solve the optimization problem of the ISO
with the goal of minimizing the cost of energy while ensuring
the planned generators are able to meet the load within a
desired confidence level. In Section III, we study the effect
of congestion on the electricity market and obtain an upper
bound on the risk-based committed power. In Section IV, we
formulate the profit function of the generators and describe
the reasons of decreasing the profit of the generators at a
high level of the renewables penetration. In Section V, we
illustrate numerically the effect of the renewable penetration
and reliability levels on the market price of energy, generators’
profit and deviation cost and the recovery costs. Finally,
concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
A. Related literature
There exists a rich literature which studies various aspects
of renewable energy resources in the power grid that includes
forecasting methods, energy storage, frequency regulation and
technological challenges (see, e.g., [5, 6, 7] and the references
therein). Further, there is also a trend of papers which focus on
the integration of renewable energy producers into electricity
markets, their competition and the their impact on the market
(see [8, 9, 10]). Of particular relevance, the work in [8]
investigates the integration of renewable energy resources,
specifically wind power in Germany, Spain, and the UK. The
authors in [9] focuse on the efficiency of incentive schemes
for the development of renewable energy sources and their
integration into the electricity market. The authors in [10]
study the strategic behaviors of renewable power producers
in electricity markets.
There exists another line of related literature which answers
the question of how to allocate the cost generated by the
uncertainty/variability of the renewable energy producers or the
benefit produced by their aggregation among them, satisfying
certain properties in the electricity market (see e.g., [11, 12,
13]). Authors in [13] propose an ex post cost sharing scheme
which allocates aggregate system cost back to variable energy
producers, proportional to their marginal contribution to the
aggregate system imbalance, while satisfying certain axioms
in the forward market for energy.
In this paper, we use the notion of Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CVAR) to quantify the effect of the uncertainty of
the net-load on market price of energy. CVAR has been
used in the electricity market and literature (see, e.g. [14])
to measure the risks of dispatch strategies. Several works
that are representative of the direction of this study include
[1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], which analyze the problem under
different market settings. The studies most relevant to our work
are [15] and [16]. They develop optimal strategies to inject
wind energy into the grid under a fixed market price of energy.
Unlike these works, we develop the market clearing price of
energy to quantify the effect of uncertainty of the net-load on
the market clearing price of energy.
B. Notation
The following notations are used in this work.
• N : Number of buses,
• wi : Capacity of renewable energy at node i,
• W = (w1, ..., wN ),
• KW : Number of contingency scenarios,
• Ci : Set of all connected buses to bus i,
• ptdi : Active load at bus i and time t,• ptri : Active power generated by renewables at bus i and
time t,
• ptgi : Active power generated by non-renewable genera-
tor at bus i and time t,
• pii : Asking price per unit of energy of the generating
unit at bus i,
• pir: Asking price per unit of renewable energy,
• ptij : Active power flow from the line connecting the bus
i to j at time t,
• Si : The generator start-up cost at bus i,
• βi : The no-load cost per hour for generator at bus i,
• bij : Admittance of the line connecting bus i to j,
• pmaxgi : Maximum power of generator at bus i,• pmingi : Minimum power of generator at bus i,• pmaxij : Maximum active power loss for the line connect-
ing bus i to j,
• rptgi : Reserve of generator at bus i and time t,• rpmaxgi : Maximum reserve of generator at bus i,• δptgi : Ramp up/down of generator at bus i and time t,• δpmaxgi : Maximum ramp up/down of generator at bus i,• (.)+ = max(., 0)
• sti := ptdi − ptri ,
3• P = {ptgi
∣∣1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T},
• Iti : An indicator of the event that the generator at bus
i is online at time t,
• PK = {ptkgi
∣∣1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ k ≤ KW }.
II. RELIABILITY AND RENEWABLE UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we formulate the dispatch optimization prob-
lem for a case where the renewable energy resource is present
in the electricity market. We first consider the deterministic
load and renewable generator then extend it to the stochastic
model for load and renewable energy generation. The ISO
dispatches the generators in the market based on the marginal
costs. We first assume that the load ptdi and renewable energy
generation ptri are deterministic and there is no contingency
scenario. We then formulate the dispatch optimization problem
and extend it to a scenario in which a stochastic model is
considered for the load and renewable energies. To develop an
analytical solution we consider Assumption 1.
Assumption 1:
• a) 0 ≤ pir < pi1 < ... < piN .
• b) sin(θti − θtj) ≈ θti − θtj , and vti ≈ 1.
A. Deterministic Load and Renewable Generation
The output of the ith generator satisfies the following
constraints
pmingi ≤ ptgi ≤ pmaxgi . (1)
If part b) of Assumption 1 holds then the active power injected
(or withdrawn) from bus i at time t is given as
ptgi + p
t
ri − ptdi =
∑
j∈Ci
bij(θ
t
i − θtj), (2)
The active power flow ptij for the line connecting bus i to bus
j at time t must satisfies
ptij = bij(θ
t
i − θtj) ≤ pmaxij . (3)
The ISO minimizes the total cost of energy on behalf of the
consumers as follows
P1 : min
P
w.r.t. (1)−(3)
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[
piip
t
gi + pirp
t
ri
]
. (4)
The solution to problem P1 is provided in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Let (µti, µ¯
t
i), λ
t
i, and µ˜
t
ij be the Lagrange mul-
tipliers corresponding to (1), (2), and (3) respectively. For
deterministic load and renewable generation, the solution to
problem P1 is given by
pii − λti + µti − µ¯ti = 0,∑
j∈Ci
bij [µ˜
t
ij − µ˜tji + λti − λtj ] = 0,
ptri − ptdi + ptgi =
∑
j∈Ci
bij(θ
t
i − θtj),
bij(θ
t
i − θtj) ≤ pmaxij , µ˜tij
(
bij(θ
t
i − θtj)− pmaxij
)
= 0,
pmingi ≤ ptgi ≤ pmaxgi , µti(ptgi − pmaxgi ) = 0,
µ¯ti(p
min
gi − ptgi) = 0, µti ≥ 0, µ¯ti ≥ 0,
where (µti, µ¯
t
i), λ
t
i, and µ˜
t
ij represent the Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to (1), (2), and (3) respectively.
Remark 1: Note that λti represents the locational marginal
price at bus i and time t.
Proof: See Appendix.
In the following section, we describe analytically how the
uncertainties in the renewable energy generation change LMPs.
Below, we extend the optimization problem P1 for a scenario
in which the loads and renewable generations are described as
continuous stochastic processes.
B. Stochastic Model for Load and Renewable Energy
Let pmingi = 0. Without the congestion constraint (3),
pmaxij = ∞, all locational marginal prices are equal to the
market clearing price of energy λti = λ
t
j = λ
t. Therefore, the
power balance equation (2) for all i = 1, ..., N is reduced to
N∑
i=1
ptgi =
N∑
i=1
(ptdi − ptri). (5)
Now, we extend the power balance equation (2) to a scenario
in which load ptdi and renewables p
t
ri have continuous stochas-
tic models. Let {(ptd1 , ..., ptdN )}Tt=1, and {(ptr1 , ..., ptrN )}Tt=1
be non-negative random variables with known continu-
ous probability density functions on the probability space
(Ω,F,P). For the given o ∈ Ω, {(ptd1(o), ..., ptdN (o))}Tt=1,
and {(ptr1(o), ..., ptrN (o))}Tt=1 are deterministic functions of
t that denote the load realization and renewable resource
power realization respectively. The committed generators in
the market must be able to meet the power balance (6) within
the desired level of reliability α ∈ [0 1]. This means that
sufficient resources must be planned in the scheduling problem
such that load can be met for a possible subset of realizations
Ω˜ = {o|o ∈ Ω}, where the probability of Ω˜ is at least α.
These resources ensure that for any given o ∈ Ω˜ there exists a
solution ptgij for the dispatch optimization problem such that
(6) holds:
ptgi = p
t
di(o)− ptri(o) +
∑
j∈Ci
Yij(θ
t
i − θtj), (6)
for all i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T . Below, we reformulate
the dispatch optimization problem with the new power balance
constraint (6).
Let sti = p
t
di
−ptri and nt =
(∑N
i=1(s
t
i−ptgi)
)+
. Define FWnt
as the cumulative distribution functions of nt, that depends
on the capacity of renewables W . We use the concept of
Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR)
[20] to obtain the upper bounds on the contingency scenarios.
V aRWα (n
t) determines the worst possible nt that may occur
within a given confidence level α. For a given 0 < α < 1,
the amount of nt will not exceed V aRWα (n
t) with proba-
bility α, V aRWα (n
t) = min{z|FWnt (z) ≥ α}. CV aRWα is
defined as the conditional expectation of nt above the amount
V aRWα . Let E denote the expectation over n
t, CV aRWα (n
t) =
E[nt|nt > V aRWα (nt)], and CV aRWα (nt) =
∫∞
−∞ zdF
α
nt(z),
4where
FW,αnt (z) =
{
0, if z < V aRWα (n
t)
Fnt (z)−α
1−α , otherwise
.
In our dispatch optimization problem the objective is to plan
for the generators such that they are capable of meeting the
load within the confidence level. We write the condition (6) as
CV aRWα (n
t) = 0.
Theorem 2: It is claimed that
CV aRWα (n
t) = (7){
0, if nt ≡ 0
CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑N
i=1 p
t
gi , otherwise
.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
We replace the power balance equation (6) with
CV aRWα (n
t) = 0, (8)
N∑
i=1
ptgi = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti). (9)
The implication of equation (9) is that if the total planned
power is equal to CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) then the load will be
met with confidence level α.
The ISO minimizes the total cost of energy on behalf of the
consumers as follows
P2 : min
(P 1,...,PT )
w.r.t. (1),(9)
E
PD,Pr
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[
piip
t
gi + pirip
t
ri
]
. (10)
We first ignore the congestion constraint (3) and solve the
optimization problem (10). This assumption is reasonable if
the economical profit of relaxing the congestion privilege on
its cost. We will study the effect of congestion constraint on
the planned power in the Section III.
To ensure a feasible solution for the ISO’s problems (10),
Assumption 2 is considered. It is worth noting that this
assumption must be modified for a more complex topology
of the power grid, e.g. with congestion constraints.
Assumption 2: We assume that
a) For all t = 1, ..., T
min
1≤i≤N
pmingi ≤ CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti) ≤
N∑
i=1
pmaxgi . (11)
b) max
i∈{1,...,N}
pmingi < mini∈{1,...,N}
{pmaxgi − pmingi }.
Because of part a) of Assumption 2, there exists an unique
1 ≤ k ≤ N such that ∑k−1i=1 pmaxgi < CV aRWα (∑Ni=1 sti) ≤∑k
i=1 p
max
gi . Part b) of Assumption 2 ensures that if the first
(k − 1)th generators are operating at their maximum power
and additional power is needed to meet the load, when it is
less than pmingk , then generator (k − 1)th can lower its output
power without violating its output power constraint; such that
the kth generator operates at its minimum power (pmingk ). This
is proved in Lemma 1, in below, and is drawn from part b) of
Assumption 2
Lemma 1: If 0 < CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi < p
min
gk
then
pmingk−1 < CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxgi − pmingk < pmaxgk−1 . (12)
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 3: Let (µti, µ¯
t
i) and λ
t be the Lagrange multipliers
corresponding to (1) and (9) respectively. If Assumptions 1
and 2 hold then the solution to P2 is given by
• If pmingk ≤ CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi ≤ pmaxgk
µti > 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = p
max
gi for i = 1, ..., k − 1, (13)
µtk = 0, µ¯
t
k = 0, p
t
gk
= CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−1∑
i=1
pmaxgi ,
(14)
µti = 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = 0, for all i = k + 1, ..., N, (15)
λt = pii + µ
t
i − µ¯ti, for all i = 1, ..., k, (16)
λt = pik. (17)
• If 0 < CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi < p
min
gk
µti > 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = p
max
gi for i = 1, ..., k − 2, (18)
µtk−1 = 0, µ¯
t
k−1 = 0, (19)
ptgk−1 = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxgi − pmingk ,
µtk = 0, µ¯
t
k > 0, p
t
gk
= pmingk , µ
t
i = 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, (20)
ptgi = 0, for all i = k + 1, ..., N, (21)
λt = pii + µ
t
i − µ¯ti, for all i = 1, ..., k, (22)
λt = pik−1. (23)
• If 0 < CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) < p
min
g1
From part b) of Assumption 3, there exists an 1 ≤ k ≤
N such that pmingk ≤ CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) < p
max
gk
. Let k¯
be the smallest k that satisfies this condition, then
µti = 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = 0, for all i 6= k¯, (24)
µtk¯ = 0, µ¯
t
k¯ = 0, p
t
gk¯
= CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti), (25)
λt = pik¯. (26)
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark 2: It is evident from (??), (23) and (26), that the
market clearing price of energy (λt) is higher at times when
st has a heavier tail distribution. A heavier tail distribution
leads to a higher value of CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) and larger index
of k in (??) and (23). Similarly, a higher level of reliability
(larger α) leads to a higher market clearing price of energy.
The market clearing prices (??) and (23) are dependent on the
tail distribution of
∑N
i=1 s
t
i. The tail distribution of
∑N
i=1 s
t
i
5depends on the load and renewable energy distributions. Higher
penetration of the renewables leads to a heavier tail distribution
for the net-load and increase the amount of planned power.
Next, we study the impact of congestion constraint on the
planned power for the dispatch problem.
III. LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES AND CONGESTION
CONSTRAINT
In this section, we study the dispatch optimization problem
with the presence of congestion in the power network. We
aim to investigate the impact of congestion on the locational
marginal prices. Congestion constraints complicate deriving an
analytical solution to show the effect of renewables uncertainty
on locational marginal prices (LMPs). For the sake of simplic-
ity and to enable us to derive an analytical upper bound on
the excess planned power in the current section, we consider a
radial grid with N generator buses and consider the following
Assumption.
Assumption 3: : It is assumed that
• a) pmingi = 0 for all i = 1, ..., N ,
• b) CV aRWα (
∑N
k=i(p
t
dk
− ptrk)) ≤ pmaxgi for all i =
1, ..., N and t = 1, ...T ,
• c) pmaxij = p¯ for all lines.
Part b) of Assumption 3 implies that the ith generator is not
only able to meet its own load but also the aggregate load of
the following buses if there are no congestion constraints. This
implies that if the congestion constraints were not active then
all LMPs are equal to pit1.
Let pˆtni be the required non-renewable power to meet the
load at bus i within the reliability level α given the dispatch
powers ptg1 , ..., p
t
gi−1 . Let pˆ
t
niN be the required power to meet
the loads from bus i to bus N within the reliability level α
given the dispatch powers ptg1 , ..., p
t
gi−1 . Below, we derive a
formula for ptgi as a function of pˆ
t
ni and pˆ
t
niN . The powers
pˆtn1 and pˆ
t
n1N are given as pˆ
t
n1 = CV aR
W
α (p
t
d1
− ptr1) and
pˆtn1N = CV aR
W
α (
∑N
i=1(p
t
di
− ptri)). Based on the values of
pˆtn1 and pˆ
t
n1N one of the following may hold.
• Case I: pˆtn1N ≤ pˆtn1 + p¯
If pˆtn1N ≤ pˆtn1 + p¯ then the generator at bus 1 supplies
the total demanded power pˆtn1N without violation of the
congestion constraint. Therefore, the remaining genera-
tors do not produce any power.
ptg1 = pˆ
t
n1N , p
t
gi = 0, i = 2, ..., N (27)
λt1 = ... = λ
t
N = λ
t = pi1, (28)
pˆtni = 0, pˆ
t
niN = 0, i = 2, ..., N. (29)
• Case II: pˆtn1N > pˆtn1 + p¯
If pˆtn1N > pˆ
t
n1 + p¯ then the congestion constraint of
the line connecting bus 1 to 2 is an active constraint.
Because of part b) of Assumption 3, the generator at
bus 1 supplies the power pˆtn1 + p¯ and the rest of the
generators supply the remaining load, ptg1 = pˆ
t
n1 + p¯. It
can be deduced from part b) of Assumption 3 that there
exists an k such that CV aRWα (
∑N
i=k+1(p
t
di
−ptri)) ≤ p¯
and CV aRWα (
∑N
i=k(p
t
di
−ptri)) > p¯. These inequalities
imply that the kth generator is able to supply the total
required power for bus k through N , without violating
the congestion constraint. Therefore,
ptgi = CV aR
W
α (p
t
di − ptri), i = 2, ..., k − 1 (30)
ptgk = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=K
(ptdi − ptri))− p¯ (31)
ptgi = 0, i = k + 1, ..., N, (32)
pˆtn1 = CV aR
W
α (p
t
d1 − ptr1), (33)
pˆtn1N = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
j=1
(ptdj − ptrj )), (34)
pˆtni = CV aR
W
α (p
t
di − ptri)− p¯, i = 2, ..., k (35)
pˆtniN = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
j=i
(ptdj − ptrj ))− p¯, i = 2, ..., k
(36)
pˆtni = 0, i = k + 1, ..., N (37)
pˆtniN = 0, i = k + 1, ..., N. (38)
λti = pii, i = 1, ..., k − 1 (39)
λti = pik, i = k, ..., N. (40)
Below, we formulate pˆtni and pˆ
t
niN for all buses i = 1, 2, ..., N
as follows
pˆtn(i+1)(pˆ
t
ni , pˆ
t
niN , p
t
gi) = (41){
0 ptgi = pˆ
t
niN ,
CV aRWα (p
t
di+1
− ptri+1)− p¯ ptgi = pˆtni + p¯,
and pˆtn(i+1)N = pˆ
t
niN − ptgi . The planned power at bus i is
given as ptgi(pˆ
t
ni , pˆ
t
niN ) = min(pˆ
t
ni + p¯, pˆ
t
niN ).
Remark 3: It can be concluded from (41) that the maxi-
mum planned power in the worst case scenario is equal to∑N
i=1 CV aR
W
α (p
t
di
− ptri). Using the subadditivity property
of the CV aRWα
CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
(ptdi − ptri)) ≤
N∑
i=1
CV aRWα (p
t
di − ptri). (42)
Inequality (42), implies an upper-bound on the planned power
resulting from net-load uncertainties and congestion.
Remark 3 and inequality (42) imply that the uncertainties
in renewable generation at a given bus can lead to a higher
estimation of non-renewable generation at that bus. This leads
to an unnecessary planning for the non-renewable generator.
In the real-time, this leads to the dispatch of more expensive
generators because of the risk of active congestion constraints
in the zone of cheaper generators. Relieving the congestion
constraints reduces the effect of renewable uncertainties on
the economic efficiency of the dispatch strategy. This study
can be extended to determine the profitability of removing the
congestion at specific buses.
6IV. NON-RENEWABLE GENERATOR REVENUE FUNCTION
Loads {(ptkd1 , ..., ptkdN )}Tt=1 and renewable realizations{(ptkr1 , ..., ptkrN )}Tt=1 are deterministic functions of time for a
given contingency scenario k. We assume that the contin-
gency scenario k may occur with probability ψkW . We allow
k ∈ {1, ...,KW }, where the number of scenarios KW , the
probability ψkW , and renewable generation realizations depend
on the installed capacity of renewables {wi}Ni=1 at all locations
in the grid. Let ptkgi be the active power of the generator at
bus i, time t and scenario k. Actual active power generation
ptkgi can be different from the corresponding committed power
ptgi . Let ∆p
tk
gi = p
t
gi − ptkgi be the deviation from committed
power ptgi . Let rp
max
gi be the limit on the contingency reserve
of the generator at bus i. The power contingency reserve rptgi
of generator at bus i and time t must satisfy the following
inequalities:
0 ≤ ∆ptkgi ≤ rptgi ≤ rpmaxgi . (43)
Inequalities (43) imply that the reserve quantities must be
large enough to meet the demanded power in all contingency
scenarios. The ramp reserve δptgi of generator at bus i, for
all time t and scenarios k, k´ ∈ {1, ...,KW }, must satisfy the
following inequalities:
−δpmaxgi ≤ −δptgi ≤ ptkgi − p(t+1)k´gi ≤ δptgi ≤ δpmaxgi . (44)
Some ISOs, i.e. the Midwest ISO, provide cost recovery
for their eligible committed generators through a revenue
sufficiency guarantee. This cost recovery is to ensure enough
energy resources are committed to the market to meet the
load and reserve obligations. Because ISOs are non-profit
organizations, the cost recovery payment is reflected in the
market price of energy. We define λW as the cost recovery
per unit of generated power. λW is the average of no-load
cost, start-up cost, reserve cost and ramp-rate cost per unit
of supplied power. λW is affected by the penetration of the
renewable energies. We consider two different scenarios in
which the ISO may or may not consider the cost recovery.
In the case without cost recovery the market price of energy
is lower but there is a risk that the profit of non-renewable
generators will decline significantly. We define λW for the case
with the cost recovery (CR = 1) and without cost recovery
(CR = 0) as follows,
H =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[βiI
t
i + SiI
t
i (1− It−1i ) + frp(rptgi) + fδp(δptgi)]
(45)
λW (CR) =
{
H∑T
t=1
∑N
i=1 p
t
gi
, CR=1
0, CR=0
. (46)
The first term in (45) is the no-load cost, second term is
the start-up cost, third term is the reserve cost and fourth
term is the ramp cost. Let fp(ptgi) be the cost of generating
power ptgi . If the renewable generators were dispatchable, the
non-renewable generators would thus expect to make a profit
through this participation in the market as given by
R(P,CR) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[
ptgi
(
λti − λW (1− CR)
)− fp(ptgi)].
(47)
Where λti is the LMP at bus i and time t, and is given by
(??), (23) and (26) for the case without congestion constraint.
The LMPs for the case with congestion constraints (and for a
radial grid) is given by (28), (39) and (40). The recovery cost
λW (CR) is given by (46). The first term in (47) is the revenue,
the second term is the recovery cost, and the third term is
the cost of generating ptkgi . However, due to the unpredictable
renewable generation, the non-renewable generators will not
make this profit. The revenue they earn is determined by the
power they actually sell, which in turn, is a function of the
renewable realization. We now calculate the profit that the non-
renewable generator actually makes.
R˜(PK , CR) =
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
KW∑
k=1
ψkW
[
ptkgi
(
λti − λW (1− CR)
)
(48)
− fp(ptkgi )
]
.
Where ptkgi is the dispatched power of generator at node
i given the load and renewable realization at scenario k. If
the renewable generation is larger than the load then the
renewables are paid based on the committed price of energy
(λti), proportional to the load and excess renewable generation
is curtailed. If the realized renewables is smaller than the load,
then the renewable generator is paid based on the committed
price of energy for all the generations.
Both price λti and cost recovery λ
W (CR) are affected by the
penetration level of the renewables. The higher intermittency
and uncertainty of renewable generations increases the number
of committed generators and subsequently λW . Higher pene-
tration of the renewables may lower the locational marginal
prices λti, because of decreasing the expected net-load for the
non-renewables (this argument is only valid if the uncertainty
of renwables does not rise significantly). Higher penetration of
the renewables will increase the deviation power ∆ptkgi .
We also calculate the loss in profit of the non-renewable gen-
erators due to the fact that the renewable generators could not
be predictably dispatched and yet the grid absorbed the renew-
able supply when available and expected the non-renewables
to compensate for the intermittence of the renewables. This
defines the cost of deviation suffered by the non-renewables
as
Deviation Cost = R(P,CR)− R˜(PK , CR). (49)
The deviation cost in (49) is the difference between the
profit of the non-renewable generator, if the committed power
is dispatched, minus the expected profit over the contingency
scenarios. Decreasing the profit in higher penetration of the
renewables disincentives non-renewables to remain in the
7market. The profit of non-renewable generators must be big
enough that they at least break even over the levelized cost of
energy through the life-time of the non-renewable generators.
This problem become more crucial when the renewables have
zero marginal cost and non-renewables are losing the market
to the non-renewables. This may cause non-renewables to offer
higher prices of energy to compensate their levelized cost of
energy at times of renewable shortages and consequently more
fluctuation in the market price of energy.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the effect of increasing the penetra-
tion of the renewables energy and desired level of the reliability
on the market price of energy and profit of the non-renewables.
We consider a grid of seven generators with physical con-
straints and cost parameters in Table I. The generators cost
parameters and physical constraints are provided based on [21].
TABLE I. THE GENERATORS COST PARAMETERS AND PHYSICAL
CONSTRAINTS [21].
Generator 1 2 3 4
Production Cost ($/MWh) 7.37 22.23 31.55 176.05
Max. (MW ) 400 155 76 197
Hot Start Cost ($) 0 2258.6 1412.5 14182.5
Cold Start Cost ($) 0 616.2 1412.5 8106.9
Ramp Up and Down (MW/h) 400 155 76 197
Generator 5 6 7
Production Cost ($/MWh) 180.75 241.91 315.81
Max. (MW ) 100 12 20
Hot Start Cost ($) 10357.8 1244.4 109.5
Cold Start Cost ($) 4575.0 695.4 109.5
Ramp Up and Down (MW/h) 100 12 20
We first fix the penetration level of the renewables at 0.9
percent and study how the market price of energy, generators
profit and planned power varies for different desired level of
reliability. In the Figure 1(a), and 1(b) the committed power
and price versus the reliability level is shown respectively. The
committed power and price are increasing in the desired level
of reliability.
The expected profit of the non-renewables with and without
recovery cost versus the reliability level is shown in Fig-
ure 1(c). In Figure 1(d), it is shown that the recovery cost is
increasing in the reliability level. Higher reliability level leads
to a higher planning for the non-renewables and increase the
recovery cost.
Below, we fix the desired level of reliability at 0.9. We vary
the penetration of the renewables and study how the market
price of energy, generator profits and planned power vary for
different levels of penetration. Figures 2(a) , and 2(b) show
(a) Committed power versus the reliability level.
(b) Price of energy for committed energy versus the
reliability level.
(c) Expected profit of the non-renewable generator
versus the reliability level.
(d) Recovery cost versus the reliability level.
Fig. 1. Reliability level and non-renewable energy production under simu-
lation scenarios
8the committed power, and price versus renewables penetra-
tion level respectively. The total amount of dispatched non-
renewable energy first decreases as the penetration of the
renewables increases because the net-load decreases. After
reaching a threshold, the required power from non-renewables
increases due to uncertainty about the production of renew-
ables. Figure 2(b) shows that there is an intermediate point
in the capacity of renewables that the market clearing price
of energy has reached its minimum. The low marginal cost
of renewables is traded-off with the additional non-renewable
generators dispatched to counter the increased risk from a
higher penetration of renewables.
(a) Committed power versus the penetration level.
(b) Price of energy for committed energy versus the
penetration level.
(c) Deviation cost versus the penetration level.
The expected deviation cost is shown in Figure 2(c). It is
shown that the deviation cost is increasing in the penetration
level. It rises rapidly if the penetration increases more than 60
(d) Expected profit of the non-renewable generator.
(e) Expected compensation cost versus the penetration
level.
(f) Expected profit of the renewable generator.
Fig. 2. Renewables penetration level and non-renewable energy production
under simulation scenarios
percent. The expected profit of the non-renewables with and
without recovery cost versus the penetration level is shown
in Figure 2(d). It is shown that the profit of non-renewables
is decreasing in the penetration level of the renewables. In
Figure 2(e), it is shown that the recovery cost has a behaviour
similar to the market price of energy. A higher penetration level
leads to a higher uncertainty for the renewable generations
and increases the recovery cost. It is shown in Figure 2(e)
that the recovery cost rises if the penetration increases more
than 60 percent. Therefore the price of energy increases after
60 percent, Figure 2(b). In Figure 2(f), the expected profit of
renewables with and without the recovery and deviation cost is
shown. It is observed that the profit of renewables is decreasing
9in the penetration level, if it is more than 60 percent.
VI. CONCLUSION
We obtain an analytical formula to quantify the amount of
committed power and market clearing price of energy as a
function of the desired level of reliability and penetration level
of the renewable energies. We also obtain an analytical upper-
bound on the amount of committed power resulting from net-
load uncertainties and congestion constraints. It is observed
that the power and price of energy decrease in renewables
penetration level until a threshold then start rising due to
uncertainties in the renewables realizations. It is observed that
the amount of committed power and the market price of energy
are increasing in the reliability level. The market price of
energy may increase due to the uncertainty of the net-load.
The expectation that increasing the penetration of renewable
energy reduces the market price of energy would be untrue if
uncertainty in renewable energy generation is increased by a
higher penetration level. The recovery cost of non-renewables
generators, to compensate start-up costs, no-load cost, ramp
reserve cost and contingency reserve cost, increases in the
reliability level. The deviation of the committed power from
dispatched power is increasing in the penetration level of the
renewables.
VII. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1:
The Lagrangian function for the constrained optimization
problem (4) for the given time t can be written as:
Lt(P t) = min
P t
[
N∑
i=1
[
piip
t
gi + pirp
t
ri
]
(50)
+
N∑
i=1
λti
[
− ptgi + ptdi − ptri +
∑
j∈Ci
bij(θ
t
i − θtj)
]
+
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ci
µ˜tij
[
bij(θ
t
i − θtj)− pmaxij
]
+
N∑
i=1
µti(p
t
gi − pmaxgi ) +
N∑
i=1
µ¯ti(p
min
gi − ptgi)
]
.
The optimal solutions for ptgi and θ
t
i are obtained by solving
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (51)-(59) for all
i = 1, ..., N as follows.
pii − λti + µti − µ¯ti = 0, (51)∑
j∈Ci
bij [µ˜
t
ij − µ˜tji + λti − λtj ] = 0, (52)
ptri − ptdi + ptgi =
∑
j∈Ci
bij(θ
t
i − θtj), (53)
bij(θ
t
i − θtj) ≤ pmaxij , (54)
pmingi ≤ ptgi ≤ pmaxgi (55)
µ˜tij
(
bij(θ
t
i − θtj)− pmaxij
)
= 0 (56)
µti(p
t
gi − pmaxgi ) = 0, (57)
µ¯ti(p
min
gi − ptgi) = 0, (58)
µti ≥ 0, µ¯ti ≥ 0. (59)
The equations (51) and (52) are obtained by solving ∂L∂ptgi
= 0
and ∂L
∂θti
= 0 respectively. (53)-(55) are the feasibility condi-
tions. (56)-(58) are the complementary slackness conditions.
The inequalities (59) are the non-negativity conditions.
Proof of Theorem 2: From [20]
CV aRWα (n
t) = min
η∈<
{
η +
1
1− αE[n
t − η]+
}
. (60)
We first prove that the minimizer of (60) is non-negative.
Suppose the minimizer of (60) is negative (η ≤ 0). Let
η = −η+, where η+ = |η|, then
arg min
η∈<
{
η +
1
1− αE[n
t − η]+
}
(61)
= arg min
η+∈<+
{ αη+
1− α +
1
1− αE[n
t]
}
.
The equality can be explained by nt ≥ 0, and the linear
property of the expectation. It is evident that the minimizer
of (61) is η+ = 0. Therefore, the minimizer of (60) is non-
negative (η ≥ 0). Because of the convexity of CV aRWα ,
the minimizer of (60) is obtained by taking the derivative of
η + 11−αE[n
t − η]+ with respect to η as
η∗ = V aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
N∑
i=1
ptgi . (62)
By substituting η∗ in η + 11−αE[n
t − η]+
CV aRWα (n
t) = −
N∑
i=1
ptgi + CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti). (63)
Proof of Theorem 3: We assume that the generator i is
able to raise its generation from pmingi to p
max
gi . Therefore, the
optimization problem (10) is disjoint in time. The Lagrangian
function for the constrained optimization problem (10), at time
10
t, can be written as:
min
P t
L(P t) = min
P t
E
PD,Pr
N∑
i=1
[
piip
t
gi + pirip
t
ri + µ
t
i(p
t
gi − pmaxgi )
(64)
+ µ¯ti(p
min
gi − ptgi)
]
+ λt
(− N∑
i=1
ptgi + CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti)
)
.
It is evident that the Lagrange function (64) is convex in
ptgi . The optimal solution P
t = (ptg1 , ..., p
t
gN ) are obtained by
solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (65)-(70)
for all i = 1, ..., N as follows,
pii − λt + µti − µ¯ti = 0, (65)
N∑
i=1
ptgi = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti), (66)
pmingi ≤ ptgi ≤ pmaxgi , (67)
µti(p
t
gi − pmaxgi ) = 0, (68)
µ¯ti(p
min
gi − ptgi) = 0, (69)
µti ≥ 0, µ¯ti ≥ 0. (70)
By solving (65)-(70), the values of {µti}Ni=1, {µ¯ti}Ni=1 and λt
are given below based on the value of CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) −∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi .
• pmingk ≤ CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi ≤ pmaxgk
µti > 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = p
max
gi for i = 1, ..., k − 1, (71)
µtk = 0, µ¯
t
k = 0, p
t
gk
= CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−1∑
i=1
pmaxgi ,
(72)
µti = 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = 0, for all i = k + 1, ..., N, (73)
λt = pii + µ
t
i − µ¯ti, for all i = 1, ..., k (74)
λt = pik. (75)
• 0 < CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi < p
min
gk
µti > 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = p
max
gi for all i = 1, ..., k − 2,
(76)
µtk−1 = 0, µ¯
t
k−1 = 0, (77)
ptgk−1 = CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxgi − pmingk ,
µtk = 0, µ¯
t
k > 0, p
t
gk
= pmingk , (78)
µti = 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, (79)
ptgi = 0, for all i = k + 1, ..., N, (80)
λt = pii + µ
t
i − µ¯ti, for all i = 1, ..., k (81)
λt = pik−1. (82)
• 0 < CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) < p
min
g1
From part b) of Assumption 3, there exists an 1 ≤ k ≤
N such that pmingk ≤ CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i) < p
max
gk
. Let k¯
be the smallest k that satisfies this condition, then
µti = 0, µ¯
t
i = 0, p
t
gi = 0, for all i 6= k¯, (83)
µtk¯ = 0, µ¯
t
k¯ = 0, p
t
gk¯
= CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti), (84)
λt = pik¯. (85)
Proof of Lemma 1: The right side inequality in (12) is
obvious. Below the left side inequality is proven. Because of
part b) of Assumption 3,
pmingk−1 < p
max
gk−1 − pmingk . (86)
Because of 0 < CV aRWα (
∑N
i=1 s
t
i)−
∑k−1
i=1 p
max
gi
pmaxgk−1 < CV aR
W
α (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxgi . (87)
It is concluded from (86) and (87)
pmingk−1 < p
max
gk−1 − pmingk (88)
< CV aRWα (
N∑
i=1
sti)−
k−2∑
i=1
pmaxgi − pmingk .
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